

INTRODUCTION

In 2001, the Swedish Security Service (Säpo) gave priority to fighting crime emanating from right-wing extremist groups or from the autonomous movement, above all during the Swedish EU presidency. Following the terrorist attacks in the USA on 11 September, the focus shifted to combating Islamist terrorism. Last year's events put a strain on the resources for counter-subversion and counter-terrorism, but also personal protection and surveillance activities were very strained, to the detriment of counter-espionage and general protective security work.

The events that occurred during the Swedish EU presidency can in a way be seen as a parenthesis in Säpo's work. They did, however, confirm the international trend that important political meetings risk being subjected to actions involving violence. Considerable protection measures may therefore be necessary also in the future.

The 'war' declared by the USA on international terrorism will no doubt go on in the foreseeable future. The demands on Säpo's ability to participate in the extensive international counter-terrorism cooperation joined by Sweden will remain high.

The review that has been going on since the end of 1998, with the aim of strengthening the capacity of the police service to fight serious organized crime, to a great extent concerns also Säpo. In 2001, the National Police Board (RPS) presented its findings to the Government, suggesting that Säpo and the National Criminal Investigation Department (RKP) be replaced by a new integrated operative unit within RPS. In the ensuing consultation process it turned out that several referral bodies were cautious of the suggestion. The issue of merging Säpo and RKP was thereby dropped. In December, the Government commissioned a new report from RPS, to be presented no later than 1 October 2002. RPS shall develop the cooperation between the regular police and Säpo, and also make changes as regards the distribution of responsibilities and tasks between them or, where appropriate, suggest such changes to the Government. Measures, intended to clarify the roles, must at the same time be kept largely within the framework of the current organizational structure and be taken in close cooperation with the police service branches concerned. This work is pressing and results should, provided this is suitable, be presented as the work proceeds.

Bringing this lengthy review process to an end is a matter of urgency. It will then be possible to initiate the desired development of Säpo's organization, something that, due to the review, partly had to be postponed.

Jan Danielsson
Director-General

THE DUTIES OF THE SECURITY SERVICE

Säpo's duties and area of responsibility are stated in the ordinance (1989:773) containing instructions for the National Police Board (RPS).

The ordinance states that Säpo shall lead the police activities aiming at prevention and uncovering of offences against national security and also, police activities relating to

- combating terrorism,
- surveillance and security work referring to the central government or in connection with state visits and similar events, and
- other personal protection in accordance with special decisions.

Säpo shall also

- discharge the duties imposed on the National Police Board under the Protective Security Act (1996:627) and the Ordinance on Protective Security (1996:633),
- carry out the emergency planning with which RPS has been tasked, and
- provide other branches of the police with technical assistance inasmuch as this is suitable, given the nature of Säpo's activities.

To discharge these duties Säpo engages in four fields of activity, namely protection of the Constitution, counter-espionage and counter-terrorism, which together make up the security intelligence service, plus protective security, of which personal protection also is part. There is a number of supporting functions as well, eg as regards the use of technical aids.

Säpo's prime task is crime prevention. This means that a very large part of its resources are allocated to the activities of the protective security division. These activities are based on the high security standards set by the Government as regards the protection of the authorities involved in the total defence, and their suppliers. Though it rests with those authorities to organize their own protection, Säpo is instructed to provide advisory assistance in how to satisfy the aforementioned requirements. Säpo's responsibilities also include inspection of how issued directions relating to protective security are observed.

The aim of protective security is to create the necessary conditions for a high level of protection and to make intervention possible at an early stage when matters that may threaten national security are discovered. This embraces advisory and training activities but also other measures such as technical support and protective surveillance.

Preventive action is of paramount importance also in the security intelligence service. This means that Säpo aims primarily at intervention in order to prevent crimes from being committed. Should, for instance, a person run the risk of becoming a target for intelligence activities Säpo can inform him or her about what is going on, something that generally puts a stop to the intelligence activity. As for terrorist threats, these can be averted in a similar way, eg by informing those threatened and by taking other measures. Sometimes

various kinds of information to persons connected to security-threatening activities may be sufficient to prevent the emergence of such activities. Knowing that Säpo's attention is turned in a certain direction or being informed about the contents of Swedish legislation may act as a deterrent.

Should, in spite of this, crimes against national security be committed it is Säpo's task to expose this and to take legal measures. In many cases this means that Säpo has responsibility for the criminal investigation. In other cases Säpo has responsibility only for the necessary intelligence gathering, whereas the criminal investigation is handled by the regular police. In such cases Säpo provides the regular police with the information obtained through the intelligence gathering.


To be able to prevent as well as to uncover crimes against national security, Säpo must engage in security intelligence gathering relating to matters that may affect external and internal national security as well as counter-terrorism.

The information gathered by the security intelligence service has to be processed and analysed. A vital part of this work is the strategic assessment of current threats against national security. This overall threat analysis is updated at regular intervals and based on an analysis of the developments in Sweden and abroad. It also forms one of the bases for Säpo's annual operational planning. In addition to this, Säpo continuously produces threat assessments on an operational level, intended as support for decisions to take countermeasures in the form of eg intervention, personal protection or some other measure relating to protective security.

One of the aids used by Säpo in its operational activities is what is generally referred to as the Säpo register. In the media debate this register has been perceived as a criminal records register, which is not the case. Instead, as stated in Section 32 of the Police Data Act (1998:622) it is primarily a police intelligence register, the purpose of which is to facilitate activities aiming at the prevention and detection of offences against national security, and at combating terrorism. The register also serves as a basis for records checks in accordance with the Protective Security Act (1996:627).

Säpo's activities include cooperation with a large number of other authorities, eg those involved in the total defence. In the non-proliferation work Säpo has the specific role of coordinator. There is close and frequent cooperation between Säpo and the regular police, eg in connection with crime investigations.

Säpo's organization



Resources

<u>Allocation in percentages of total resources</u>	<u>1999</u>	<u>2000</u>	<u>2001</u>
Counter-espionage	24%	24%	21%
Counter-terrorism	19%	16%	19%
Protection of the Constitution	16%	19%	18%
Protective security	34%	34%	34%
Regular police activities	7%	7%	8%

Säpo staff has been reduced by approx. 100 persons since the early 1990s and at the end of 2001 included around 800 employees.

DEVELOPMENTS IN OTHER COUNTRIES IN 2001

Globalization, transnationalization and the emergence of the network society have changed the conditions for the exercise of power and the use of threats, and reduced the national independence of states. In this sense, the world has become smaller and during the last months of 2001 it became obvious that dramatic events will have immediate repercussions in a more and more closely linked world.

The global environment in a security policy context

The completely overshadowing world event in 2001 was the terrorist attacks in the USA on 11 September which, in addition to the immediate consequences in the form of human tragedy and material devastation, have had serious implications for the security policy agenda. In the political and military aftermath of the terrorist actions new alliances and communities of interests have been formed whereas others have loosened up.

The tendencies to American isolationism discernible during George W. Bush's first months as president, with the USA backing out of the international climate agreement as perhaps the most obvious example, after the terror attacks changed into selective multilateralism. In the autumn, the USA initiated an international coalition against terrorism, paid off its debts to the UN and resumed its commitment in the Middle East. The military actions in Afghanistan however took place outside the NATO framework and in December the USA declared its intention to leave the ABM agreement to proceed with the development of a national missile defence.

A new chapter in Russian-American relations began after 11 September, when the Russian re-orientation towards the West gained momentum. Russian criticism of American plans for a missile defence and of NATO's eastward enlargement was noticeably toned down, as was American criticism of Russia's actions in Chechnya. Instead, the two reached an outline agreement on the fight against terrorism. In terms of domestic policy Russia's President Putin has consolidated his position, but some voices within the country's defence and foreign policy bodies are critical to his western-friendly policy. Also, there are still question marks as to the degree of political freedom in Russia, in particular as concerns the independent media.

American-Chinese relations, frosty at the beginning of the year, were in 2001 characterized by pragmatism. The Chinese regime's wish to safeguard domestic stability led to moderation in its relations to the USA and Taiwan in spite of a sometimes defiant stance. Also the considerable financial values in the American-Chinese relations contributed to lessen antagonism. In spite of continued domestic repression, China was in 2001 incorporated in the global order by joining the WTO and by being chosen to arrange the 2008 Olympic Games. As with Russian-American relations a community of interests, though considerably cooler, emerged also between the USA and China in the field of counter-terrorism.

The most tangible security policy changes however took place in South and Central Asia. In spite of large potential conflicts between the regional

superpowers, the military action in Afghanistan drew to an end without spilling over into other countries. The key to this development was that Pakistan withdrew its support to the Taliban regime. At the end of the year a UN-supported provisional government took office in Afghanistan.

At the same time, rifts could however be seen in the newly established front against terrorism. Iran showed growing concern about the American involvement in the region. Also Russia made it clear that it expected the American forces to leave their bases in the central Asian republics once their mission was over. In spite of commitments to reduce the American and Russian nuclear weapon arsenals Russia and China have also expressed great concern about the consequences of the USA backing out of the ABM agreement. At the end of the year violence escalated in the disputed province of Kashmir, and the borderland between the two nuclear powers India and Pakistan saw the start of the largest military concentration of forces in years.

The conflict between Israel and the Palestinian society deepened more rapidly than expected in 2001. The issue of the Israeli settlements on the West Bank and in Gaza has remained the single most important obstacle to the peace process, and with Ariel Sharon's coming into power and the new intifada violence escalated. Since 11 September the situation has deteriorated further with repeated Palestinian acts of terror against civilian Israelis, increasingly brutal Israeli attacks in Palestinian areas and renewed confrontation between Israeli forces and the Hizbollah militia in the border area between Israel, Syria and Lebanon.

In Iran, the summer elections were a success for the reform-friendly President Khatami. The conflict with the conservative wing that controls the major part of the Government apparatus and up until now has blocked the reform process however remains.

In 2001 the USA intensified its action against Iraq. The beginning of the year saw more intensive American and British air raids than for the past two years and there have been speculations that the military campaign against terrorism would be extended to Iraq. At the end of the year the USA sharpened its criticism of Iraq's continuous refusal to conform to the UN decision on weapons inspections.

In Southeast Asia the developments in Indonesia remained in the centre of international attention in 2001. A tumultuous change of president, continuous conflicts between the country's religious groups as well as between the central power and separatists have increased fears of a setback in the halting democratization process.

The civil war atrocities in Sierra Leone came to an end in 2001. At the same time, developments in other African countries gave more cause for concern. In Zimbabwe, violence and oppression under President Mugabe increased in view of the 2002 elections. In Congo, Joseph Kabila in early 2001 took over power following the murder of his father. Hopes for a more democratic development in Congo came to nought at the end of the year following a renewed increase in the number of arrests on grounds of criticism of the regime.

Crucial decisions on the future architecture of the European security policy were made in 2001. In the end of June, the target date for the EU eastward enlargement was set to 2004 and the NATO leaders declared their intention to invite new members to the alliance at the summit in Prague in 2002. NATO's invitation is expected to comprise at least Slovenia, Slovakia and the three Baltic States. The planning of the EU military and civilian crisis handling capacity also continued, although there are still question marks as to its operational capacity. The terrorist attacks in the USA brought about a speedier integration within the EU's so-called third pillar – cooperation in police and penal law issues.

Peace was maintained in the Balkans in spite of acts of violence in Macedonia and a fragile political situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Following a lengthy extradition process the Serbian ex-president Milosevic was prosecuted in the autumn by the UN war criminal tribunal in the Hague.

A downward trend characterized the world economy in 2001. The recession in the American economy, aggravated by the terrorist attacks, spread and struck with force at the end of the year. Argentina was hurled into an economic crisis which also brought about extensive political unrest. The USA was hit by the largest bankruptcy in the country's history and by threatening political scandal when the energy company Enron, with close links to the presidential administration, was declared bankrupt.

The criticism against the current economic world order intensified in 2001 and was manifested in peaceful demonstrations as well as violent confrontations at the EU summit in Gothenburg and the G8 meeting in Genoa.

Terrorism and extremism in other countries

Terrorism and extremism are concepts defined in a variety of ways depending on the perspective of the observer and the purpose of the definition. Violence exercised for political, religious or ethnic reasons exists, to a higher or lesser degree, almost all over the world and is described by a variety of terms, such as terrorism, extremism, separatism, nationalism, fundamentalism and liberation struggle depending on the circumstances and on the perspective of the observer.

What most definitions of political extremism have in common is that the political content must deviate significantly from established ideas. Further, the choice of working methods – legal, illegal or both – is a key factor as concerns the reactions of the surrounding world. Political extremists can be active in parliamentary as well as extra-parliamentary contexts, and they may, or may not, sanction violence.

During the year, the issue of where to draw the lines between the various concepts when discussing extremism and terrorism has come up again. The EU framework decision on the fighting of terrorism is an example of European attempts to agree on a common definition and a platform for measures.

On 11 September 2001, the USA was hit by the worst terrorist attack in history so far. Neither hijacking nor suicide attacks are new features in

terrorism, but the scale and the coordination of the attacks – bearing witness of months or years of planning – and the fact that they were carried out on American soil, make them unparalleled in history.

Osama bin Laden's Islamist terrorist network al Qaida, pointed out as responsible for these deeds, illustrates a number of important changes that have taken place in international terrorism over the past decades. From having been characterized by small, closed hierarchical organizations with clear political demands, international terrorism to an increasing extent has come to be characterized by religious motives and loose transnational structures.

Most terrorist attacks are still carried out using conventional means such as explosives, firearms and kidnappings. The course of action chosen for the terrorist attacks in the USA is best described as applying unconventional methods to conventional means. The spreading of anthrax bacteria in the USA during the autumn increased the concern that a line has been crossed and that further terrorist attacks involving nuclear, biological or chemical weapons can be expected. So far, however, few groups are considered to have a motive to use these means and even fewer are considered to have the technological and financial capacity to carry out large-scale attacks using NBC weapons. The terrorist acts in the USA also show that large-scale devastation can be achieved by conventional means.

Changes as to the motives of international terrorism are manifested in the large-scale approach itself. The aim is no longer limited to making an example to get attention or to putting pressure on a regime to make political concessions. One important aim for al Qaida's activities seems to be to radicalize the broad masses in the Muslim states worldwide, using the conflict with the USA and the Western world, and thereby stir up rebellion against moderate Muslim regimes. It is mainly these countries that fight Islamist extremism.

Bin Laden's network is a further example of the shift that has taken place these past years as concerns the geographical centre of the Islamist terrorist groups – from the Middle East and North Africa (with the exception of Algeria) to Afghanistan, Pakistan, Central Asia and Caucasia in the north-east and the Horn of Africa in the south. The American bombings in Afghanistan have probably caused serious damage to al Qaida's structure, but there are branches and support structures in several countries across the world, in Europe and North America as well as in the Middle East, Asia and Africa. In several East African countries and on the Arabian peninsula, eg in Somalia, Sudan and Yemen which the hunt for al Qaida supporters reached during the autumn, leaders of Islamist extremist movements strongly condemned USA's attacks in Afghanistan. Most of the perpetrators of the attacks in the USA were of Saudi descent.

Pakistan's self-appointed president, General Musharraf, has endorsed the US fight against international terrorism. His tough campaign against Islamists is however controversial in Pakistan and the conflict in Kashmir further complicates the situation. The propagation of Islamism in Pakistan seems to be more limited than has been claimed by many experts, but the separatists in the Indian province are seen by many Pakistanis as freedom fighters and

enjoy strong popular support. Following the attack on the Indian parliament in December, attributed to two Kashmirian terrorist groups, the international pressure on Musharraf to fight Islamist violence has increased further.

In the Central Asian republics, the regimes have for a long time campaigned strongly against Islamists. In Tadjikistan, the Islamist movement Hizb-ut Tahrir al Islami, so far engaging mainly in the dissemination of propaganda, is the fastest growing political movement. In Uzbekistan, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan is working to overthrow the current regime by force.

In Caucasia, the fighting in Chechnya between Russian government forces and separatists continued in 2001 and escalated on both sides following 11 September. In the rest of Russia there were however no new terrorist actions.

Also in Southeast Asia Islamic extremism continued to manifest itself in the use of violence in 2001. In the Indonesian province of Aceh, the regime's conflict with the Islamist separatist guerilla GAM has intensified. In the hunt for al Qaida supporters the USA is looking also at Indonesia and possible links between Indonesian Islamists and al Qaida. The Indonesian regime has joined the coalition against terrorism. Measures that are too severe however risk to alienate the moderate Muslim parties in the coalition government. In the Philippines, the Islamist separatist guerilla Abu Sayyaf, which attracted international attention due to the long list of persons it had held hostage, continued its violence campaign in 2001.

In Algeria, the violence between the military regime and the Islamists flared up with renewed force at the end of the year. As the conflict between the regime and the Berber minority in the country also led to acts of violence during the year, the risk of a new civil war on several fronts has increased. A series of attacks, attributed mainly to the Islamist terrorist group GIA, took place around the turn of the year 2001/2002. For the first time in two years the Islamist violence reached the capital.

The spiralling violence between Israel and the Palestinian society has caused a great deal of friction within the Palestinian camp. The leader of the Palestinian authority, Yassir Arafat, following the terrorist attacks in the USA issued a decree on a new cease-fire and during the autumn intervened on several occasions against Palestinian assailants. Arafat has however been severely criticized by his own people, and the Israeli government's uncompromising actions have contributed actively to undermining his position. The militant Islamist organizations Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad were behind several attacks on Israeli targets. Also other groups, eg the al Aqsa brigades and the non-religious organization PFLP, however increased their activities during the year. All of them, including members of Arafat's own organization Fatah, have defied the cease-fire. Arafat's international position has also been weakened, above all since a shipment of weapons, suspected to be intended for the Palestinian authority, was seized by Israel. Following the resumption of attacks by the Lebanese Hizbollah on Israeli positions in the Golan Heights, there is an increased risk of further escalation of the conflict in the region.

The Islamist violence and the conflict in the Middle East have dominated the agenda following the attacks in the USA. But also other groupings, separatist or extremist, have continued to carry out violent attacks worldwide.

In the summer of 2001, the separatist movement LTTE in Sri Lanka, the 'Tamil Tigers', carried out what was then described as the most devastating act of terrorism in aviation history. A suicide team blew up 26 civilian and military aircraft in Sri Lanka's international airport and in an adjacent air force base. Following the change of government in Sri Lanka in December, a mutual cease-fire was called and the hope for a peaceful dialogue increased.

In Latin America, the languishing peace process in Colombia between the government and paramilitary groups was threatened by the increasing violence from mainly the Marxist FARC guerilla.

In Europe, the Basque separatist movement ETA in Spain further escalated its violence campaign in 2001. The police and the military plus representatives of the judicial system and the Spanish state were still the main targets for attacks. In Northern Ireland the issue of IRA decommissioning has caused repeated setbacks to the peace process and in 2001 the province alternated between autonomy and direct rule. The attacks, carried out by Protestant paramilitary groups as well as IRA splinter groups, continued. The number of terrorist attacks was however lower than the year before. Also on Corsica and in Macedonia attacks with separatist features were carried out in 2001. A peaceful disarmament of large parts of the Albanian UCK guerilla in the Balkans could however take place under NATO supervision. Since the terrorist attacks in the USA, governments have adopted a more stringent attitude towards manifestations of extremism, thereby significantly reducing the political scope of violent elements. The threat of violence, mainly from splinter groups, however remains

The parliamentary elections held in Europe in 2001 showed both electoral success and falling support for right-wing extremist and extreme nationalist parties, something that may constitute a possible indicator of xenophobic tendencies in the countries concerned. Mainly Italy and Denmark attracted international attention in this context. The Italian elections in May were won by an alliance, the largest party of which was the right-wing populist Forza Italia under Silvio Berlusconi. Its allies, the extreme nationalist and right-wing extremist parties Lega Nord and Alleanza Nazionale did not, however, attain the expected number of votes. In November, there were parliamentary elections in Denmark, where the xenophobic Dansk Folkeparti obtained more than 20 per cent of the votes.

In France and Austria the support for right-wing populist parties seems to have fallen. Front National in France lost votes in the municipal elections and in Austria the support for Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs has fallen by almost 10 per cent since the 1999 elections. In Germany the Bundestag, the Bundesrat and the Government petitioned the Constitutional Court for a ban on the right-wing extremist party Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands. The petition had not yet come up for consideration at the end of 2001.

The number of offences with racist features is reported to have increased in several European countries, among them Germany and Denmark, following the terrorist attacks in the USA on 11 September. Many Muslims in Europe and in the USA also felt that people were suspicious of them and that they were being made scapegoats for these attacks.

As concerns the extra-parliamentary-oriented European White Power movement, two events in 2001 attracted particular attention. Following the murder of a 15-year-old immigrant boy in Norway, the Norwegian Government appointed an expert group to investigate the issue of whether to ban Nazi parties and organizations in the country. Further, the north of England saw violent riots between right-wing extremists, immigrants and anti-racists, severely disturbing public order for several days.

As for the left-oriented autonomous movement, its protests against financial and political structures in society have become increasingly violent, particularly as concerns international concentrations of power and the summits of these. The protests at the EU summit in Gothenburg and the G8 meeting in Genoa clearly showed the scale of the threat posed by violence-prone activists of the anti-globalization movement. The World Bank conference that was to take place in Barcelona on 25-27 June 2001 was cancelled due to fears that groupings critical of globalization would jeopardize security. In spite of this, partially violent protests against the World Bank were still carried out in Barcelona.

The demonstrations at the World Economic Forum in Salzburg in July did not, however, turn as violent as many had feared. It is true that there were a few instances of stone-throwing, but relatively few protesters had arrived and there were practically no militant activists. During the Belgian EU presidency strong protests were expected against the meetings in Liège, Gent and Laeken. Demonstrations against these meetings were however quite orderly, except for in Laeken, where demonstrators engaged in wilful damage.

In this context it is interesting to note that the meeting of the finance ministers in Liège discussed eg the Tobin tax, one of the key issues of the anti-globalization movement. The finance ministers has entrusted the European Commission with the task of investigating possibilities to prevent currency speculations.

Intelligence activities

In times of uncertainty, rapid development and far-reaching interdependence between states it is natural that there is a great need for intelligence. On the international arena it is of vital importance to be well-informed about one's relations to others, and also about their political, financial and military circumstances and intentions. Intelligence activities aim to identifying threats as well as opportunities in good time in order to safeguard one's own interests and keep up with the competition in the international game. Examples include monitoring an opponent's military capacity and intentions, securing a state's future energy supply and strategic importance or gaining advantages on an intensely competitive market.

The single factor to have had the greatest impact on intelligence activities these past years is technological development. The variety of actors and the targets for information gathering as well as the conditions for engaging in intelligence activities have diversified and changed.

Technological achievements with a large economic and military potential generate intense competition for patents, markets and technological superiority. Progress is made mainly on the civilian side, but technological developments have a bearing also on defence issues. Security policy, technological and economic purposes are therefore in this respect very closely linked. In assessments of the intelligence threat in the economic and technological fields, traditional considerations such as the target country's military strategic importance and geopolitical position become less relevant. Other aspects such as the country's international status as concerns research, industry and exports instead become more important.

The technological developments have also led to the emergence of new intelligence actors. Non-governmental actors are very active in areas such as economy and technology. Furthermore, states that are otherwise friendly can here be seen engaging in active intelligence gathering. The collaboration in this field between governmental and non-governmental actors further contributes to complexity.

The technological developments and the emergence of the knowledge society is reflected, just as with businesses, in the activities of the intelligence services. Today's intelligence activities are shaped by a rapidly increasing amount of worldwide information plus increasing access to it through the Internet and wireless communication. The possibilities of covert gathering of open as well as secret information through signals intelligence, Internet intelligence and computer intrusion have increased. Several intelligence services today go for 'niche' training and staff with specialist competence. In parallel with this, traditional and conspiratorial methods such as coded messages, agent recruitment and blackmail are still extensively used.

In 2001, a number of important international events had a bearing on the large intelligence actors and the relations between them. The change of president in the USA led to a cooler climate in its relations with Russia and China. While the USA in the spring was shaken by the discovery of a mole in the FBI – resulting in an 'expulsion war' between the Russian and American intelligence services – an American spy plane had to force-land on Chinese soil, something that led to strained diplomatic relations. The terrorist attacks in the USA however brought about changes in the relations between the intelligence communities. A close intelligence cooperation in the field of counter-terrorism has been established between Russia and the USA, and Russia has declared its withdrawal from symbolically important signals intelligence centres in Vietnam and Cuba. Also the USA and China have found a common interest in the fight against terrorism.

The US-led counter-terrorism campaign launched in September has led to far-reaching international intelligence cooperation within this field. This does not, however, necessarily entail a reduction in intelligence needs in other fields, since these may be guided by other interests. The increased

workload has meant that many security and intelligence services have been allocated considerable extra resources.

In spite of technological developments there is still a need for continuity in the intelligence activities. This is underlined by the fact that no major changes have been noted as concerns the aim and direction of foreign intelligence activities conducted in Sweden.

Technological vulnerability

The past few years have seen growing awareness of the risks resulting from increasing IT dependence and the complexity of modern technology. Several western countries, headed by the USA, have taken this issue very seriously. They have set up particular authorities and surveillance bodies to monitor the developments and work for enhanced security protection of society infrastructure. In Sweden, the corresponding work has so far been carried out in cooperation between various authorities, Säpo being one of them.

In 2001, a first step was taken towards a clearer responsibility distribution also in Sweden. Against the background of the report of the Vulnerability and Security Commission (SOU 2001:41), the Government presented a bill (2001/02:10) suggesting the setting up of a new authority to coordinate planning as regards preparedness in case of severe strains on society in peace and civil defence. It was suggested that the new authority be given overall responsibility for IT security in society.

One of Säpo's tasks is inspection of the protective security of government authorities that are part of the total defence, and another is giving security advice to trade and industry and the public. Issues concerning IT security are a cornerstone in this work. The IT dependence of Swedish society makes information security inconceivable unless IT systems of importance to society (incl. phone/computer networks) are equipped with the necessary protection.

The problems associated with technology and its development have more to do with increasing vulnerability than with raised threat levels.

There are no signs that terrorists and violence-prone extremists would be on the verge of abandoning well-tried methods in favour of electronic attacks. To these actors, IT is an operative tool rather than a weapon. The picture becomes more complicated when we talk about intelligence threats from foreign states, since technological gathering (eg signals intelligence) can in many cases be the most efficient way for them to access information that is confidential or in other ways sensitive. In general, there is still no clear picture of threats in the technological field, but they are primarily associated with phenomena such as unlawful computer intrusion and economic crime.

It is worrying that the technological development gives rise to increasingly complex and badly-arranged system solutions while various systems are linked to each other, nationally as well as globally. This generates new and stronger interdependence, in itself creating opportunities for new and unexpected types of attacks. Unfortunately, in the design of new technology more advanced functionality is almost always given priority over security aspects.

PROTECTIVE SECURITY

The Protective Security Section carries out Säpo's duties under the Protective Security Act (1996:627) and the Ordinance on Protective Security (1996:633) and is also responsible for Säpo's internal protective security. Its main task is to assist authorities and companies in creating and maintaining adequate protective security, by inspection, advice and information, and to carry out record searches on demand.

The responsibilities of the Protective Security Section also include dignitary protection, primarily as concerns the central Government, the Royal Family and foreign diplomats.

The Protective Security Section has resources for record searches, IT security and other technical protective security, advice to authorities, eg those involved in the Total Defence, for protective security training and for inspection of the protective security of authorities and others.

One of Säpo's most important tasks is to assist, by inspection and advice, authorities and companies in achieving adequate protective security. An important instrument for raising the level of protective security is training and instruction of personnel dealing with classified information. When visiting authorities and companies for inspection and advisory assistance, priority is therefore given to such issues. In 2001, approximately 8,000 people benefited from some form of security-related advice or information through the agency of Säpo.

The need for protective security measures on account of the Swedish EU presidency during the first six months of the year meant that the Section, for resource reasons, had to refrain from or postpone other activities. Within the police, Säpo has had responsibility for the coordination of certain security matters at a number of EU meetings across the country. Examples of such matters are threat assessments, technical protection, record searches and the personal security of delegates. This work has been carried out in close cooperation with representatives of the Cabinet Office, the regular police and other local interested parties.

Issues relating to IT and information security in society have been the subject of several official government reports these past years. Säpo has participated in this work with the objective that the competence found in Säpo, as well as in the other branches of the police, should be taken advantage of in the redistribution of responsibilities in this field. The competence of the police is based on experience from crime investigations and crime prevention plus an invaluable exchange of know-how in various international forums. For better future protection of systems of vital importance to society against attacks in the form of information operations and intrusion, also the tools of the police should be part of society's common toolbox. This could apply eg to evaluation of risks as a consequence of attacks on information systems, since it is important that such attacks are placed in a context of events that are continuously followed up and analysed.

In Säpo's crime investigation activities, the use of storage media has become increasingly common as concerns evidence and other information of importance to the investigation. The technology and the ability to search for and secure such information have developed during the year. This development of skills takes place in cooperation with, among others, the regular police and through Säpo's participation in the EU cooperation and in Interpol's work in this field.

In its advisory activities Säpo must be able to describe the threats and risks resulting from an ever-increasing dependence on technology. It is therefore the particular responsibility of the Protective Security Section to monitor developments that may contribute to increased technological vulnerability in society. In order to achieve and maintain a high level of knowledge in this area, it has become necessary also to develop the dialogue with the private sector. Säpo in 2001 initiated a network for the exchange of information on the development of technology that may render society more vulnerable. Examples of activities include a seminar presenting various methods to create protection against increased vulnerability. The seminar, which was aimed at management representatives of authorities as well as companies, met with a lot of interest and gathered more than 200 participants.

In 2001, Säpo, jointly with the Stockholm County Police, produced a special information leaflet intended as support for an employer when employees are or have been subjected to violence or threats.

Traditional protective security work (limited access, information security, security vetting, training and inspection) has in no way become obsolete as a result of developments in IT and technology areas. On the contrary, it is still vital that authorities and others be informed of the importance of looking at protective work in its entirety. There is a tendency to look at information security only in terms of technology, which may result in the development of protection against risks that have been exaggerated while other flaws go unnoticed.

Consequently, adequate information security depends also on efficient physical protection in order to determine who will be granted physical access to various information systems (limited access). In Säpo's experience, employees of an authority or a company or insiders still pose the main threat to information systems. Security vetting and other recruitment activities aiming at employing loyal and reliable staff are therefore the most important instruments in the protective security work. These measures, in combination with employee training and information with the purpose of creating an understanding for necessary security regulations, are thus prerequisites for high information security. Inspections of how such regulations are observed may reveal flaws but at the same time signal to the employees that the protection of information is important.

Säpo's inspections also in 2001 showed that authorities find it difficult to produce thorough security analyses. Since such analyses are the basis for adjustments to protective security measures in order to meet the authorities' needs it is obvious that they need further assistance in this area. Säpo will

therefore develop its ability further in order to provide better assistance with the analysis work.

The Records Board decides in matters regarding disclosure of information relating to security vetting activities. Säpo, however, carries out the Board's office functions and handles the security vetting tasks for which Säpo is responsible under the protective security legislation. In 2001, the total of requests for security vetting amounted to approximately 66,000. The Records Board decided that information from Säpo's records was to be disclosed only as concerned nine individuals. In this context it should however be pointed out that a record search is only one of many steps in the suitability assessment part of an employment process. As mentioned above, it is just as important that an authority or anyone entitled to requesting a records search as part of their own security vetting process investigates and assesses conditions that may affect a decision on possible employment.

Säpo's responsibilities in the personal protection area include protection and security work relating to the central Government, the Royal Family, foreign diplomats, state visits or similar events.

It is in the nature of things that such activities may vary considerably in terms of threat assessment and of protective measures required. During later years, the level of threat has been low, and it has therefore been possible to limit the protective measures. In 2001, the situation changed considerably, due to the extensive meeting activity during the Swedish EU presidency and to the terrorist attacks in the USA, both of which caused a surge in dignitary protection. In addition to a permanent need for protection for the central Government, the Royal family and certain diplomatic staff, there have been approximately 200 instances of temporary protection, a majority during state visits and similar events.

PROTECTION OF THE CONSTITUTION

The Protection of the Constitution Section is tasked with the prevention and uncovering of threats against national internal security, ie illegal activities which aim to use violence, threat or force to change the constitution, influence the political institutions or authorities to make decisions in a given direction, or to prevent citizens from exercising their fundamental civil rights and freedoms.

In 2001, Säpo's activities in the protection of the constitution area focused on domestic groups and networks plus individuals who have shown, through action or otherwise, that they are prepared to use violence or the threat of violence or support such action for their own political gain. This goes mainly for persons with connections to the White Power movement or to the autonomous movement. Säpo intensified its activities in this area during the first half of the year, ie during the Swedish EU presidency.

As in previous years, Säpo in 2001 compiled statistics of offences related to national internal security that had been reported to the police. The report containing statistics for the year 2000 was published in June 2001 and can also be found on the police home page (www.police.se). The trend we began to see a few years ago, as regards an increase in the number of reported offences with an ideological connection to the White Power movement, continued also from 1999 to 2000, when the number of such offences increased from 1331 to 2092. The predominant offences are ethnic agitation, wilful damage and unlawful threat. Changes in the total number of offences linked with the White Power movement are chiefly due to the fact that the number of reports concerning ethnic agitation has increased. During the period 1997-2000 also wilful damage (incl. graffiti), unlawful threat, harassment and slander and libel offences made up a large percentage of the increase. Crimes of violence with an ideological connection to the White Power movement have during the past few years seen a slower increase than White Power-related offences in total.

The total number of offences that can be related to the autonomous movement and the various issues it fights for has during the period 1997-2000 varied between approximately 550-750. A breakdown by category shows that the number of anti-fascist and other left-oriented offences reported to the police more than trebled, from 113 in 1997 to 383 in 2000. During these first three years of the survey the predominant offences were graffiti, wilful damage and unlawful threat, although their relative order may have varied somewhat. A certain change took place in 2000, when assault became the third most common offence after graffiti and wilful damage. For the third year running the number of reported offences related to animal rights activism fell.

Offences targeting representatives of decision-making bodies are particularly serious. Two surveys conducted in 2000 and in 2001 by the Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Statistics Sweden (the Central Statistical Office) revealed that one in five or six municipal committee chairmen

had considered resigning due to threats received. 90 per cent of all chairmen of municipal executive boards and 86 per cent of all committee chairmen answered the questions in the survey. One in four chairmen of municipal executive boards and almost one in five committee chairmen at the time reported that they had been subjected to violence or threats of violence in the past year. Almost 90 per cent of the chairmen of municipal executive boards and 84 per cent of the committee chairmen who answered the questions claimed to know who was behind the threats or the acts of violence. Almost 17 per cent of them stated that the threats or violence emanated from racist or xenophobic groupings and individuals whereas almost 8 per cent of the chairmen of municipal executive boards and almost 3 per cent of the committee chairmen stated that the threats or violence emanated from the autonomous movement.

Against the background of the above-mentioned surveys, the Government in September 2001 appointed a working party on violence and threats against politicians. The working party includes representatives from the judiciary and municipalities.

The White Power movement

The White Power movement is a term denoting a movement consisting of a number of organizations, self-governing local groups, networks and individuals sharing the same right-wing extremist ideology. Within the movement there is an idea that a continuous territory for the white race only should be created. There are, however, differing opinions on how to realize this. Some think that there will be a racial war, whereas others have a more apocalyptic view. Another common idea is that the world is run by a Jewish conspiracy referred to as ZOG (Zionist Occupation Government).

The racist propaganda is of vital importance to the White Power movement. Although the Internet has become an established tool for communication and propaganda, a large amount of papers, magazines, books, posters, information and membership bulletins, leaflets, etc. are still published. White Power concert activities are used to gather supporters, recruit new members, sell magazines, CDs and clothes etc. and to finance other activities.

The propaganda dissemination in Sweden is still relatively extensive. Crack-downs on individual distributors these past years have however disturbed the activities and contributed to reducing the propaganda flow somewhat. In 2001, the owners of a propaganda company were sentenced for false accounting. A case against the owners of another propaganda company, charged with offences against the Freedom of Speech Act, was heard by the court of appeal in November. The district court had found them guilty of ethnic agitation by dissemination of Nazi propaganda, but had also judged the period for prosecution to have elapsed, and had therefore acquitted them. The Chancellor of Justice (JK) appealed against this verdict since he was of the opinion that some of the video films involved were being copied at the time of the crack-down and therefore the period for prosecution should be counted from their date of manufacture. No judgement had yet been pronounced at the end of the year.

The leading organizations, associations and networks within the White Power movement are Nationalsocialistisk Front (NSF, National Socialist Front), Svenska Motståndsrörelsen (SMR, Swedish Resistance Movement), Blood & Honour, Ariska Brödraskapet (AB, Aryan Brotherhood), Brödraskapet Wolfpack (Bsk Wp, Wolfpack Brotherhood) and Info 14.

Nationalsocialistisk Front (NSF, National Socialist Front), founded in 1994, is headquartered in Karlskrona and has an organizational structure similar to that of political parties. It is led by a national council that has the main responsibility for the organization's activity and finances. Directly under the national council there are four local groups, in their turn responsible for some 25-30 local branches.

In 2001, a number of NSF members were sentenced not only for offences with political motives but also for other crimes. On New Year's Night 2000/2001 a cottage burned down in Tystberga. It had previously belonged to an NSF member but had been sold by order of a court. At an early stage, suspicions fell on the previous owner who was later on sentenced to 2 1/2 years in prison for arson. Four perpetrators with connections to the NSF who had been sentenced for assault on two immigrants in Nora appealed against the district court sentence. The court of appeal upheld the district court decision in three cases and reduced the penalty in one case. Another member was given a suspended sentence for assaulting an anti-racist. In December the same member was arrested again, together with two others, for a bank robbery in Kolsva. December also saw the start of a trial against a member plus the legally responsible publisher of the publication *Judefrågan* (The Jewish Issue) who were charged with ethnic agitation. The member had written the introduction to the publication and appeared before Blekinge District Court. The legally responsible publisher appeared before Gotland District Court, where he was charged with ethnic agitation and sentenced to six months in prison in January 2002. The printers were also reported for failure to report the publication to the National Library of Sweden.

Svenska Motståndsrörelsen (SMR, the Swedish Resistance Movement) was founded in 1995. The organization consists of three units: the parent organization SMR, the youth organization Nationell Ungdom (NU, National Youth) which is divided into regions controlling local groups, plus the umbrella organization Förbundet för Nationella Stödföreningar (FNS, the Association for National Support Organizations) which contribute to the dissemination of SMR propaganda in smaller local groups.

Individual members of the SMR were reported and sentenced for several offences with political motives in 2001. During the first months of the year, one of the leaders served a prison sentence for ethnic agitation. In a couple of municipalities the handing out of leaflets was reported to the police as ethnic agitation and charges were made. SMR's magazine *Folktribunen* (The People's Tribune) was reported to the Chancellor of Justice, for ethnic agitation as well as for failing to report to the Swedish Patent and Registration Office that there was a new legally responsible publisher. The report concerning ethnic agitation did not, however, result in any charges. Four SMR members were sentenced to prison for aggravated robbery and preparation to commit aggravated theft, having robbed a newsagent's in Jönköping.

Blood & Honour is a movement aiming to unite the white race through propaganda (mainly music). It was founded in Britain in the mid-1980s and has been active in Sweden in its present form since 1997. Blood & Honour plays a key role in White Power production and distribution of propaganda and has in later years often arranged White Power concerts. The concert activities, which were previously quite extensive, were in 2001 however practically non-existent. Although propaganda dissemination is the core activity of the movement, its supporters proneness to violence should not be underestimated. These past years, several of them have been sentenced for serious crimes involving violence. In 2001, one supporter was sentenced to one year in prison for weapons offences.

The two race revolutionary prison organizations Ariska Brödrskapet (AB, Aryan Brotherhood) and Brödrskapet Wolfpack (Bsk Wp, Wolfpack Brotherhood) and their members did not cause the police to intervene against serious crime on as many occasions in 2001 as in 2000. In its present form, the AB as a group cannot be regarded as a real threat to national internal security, although a handful of members may in certain cases pose a threat to individuals, mainly representatives of the judicial system. As for Bsk Wp, a few members were released from prison and others were sentenced to prison in 2001. Three of the released members have been reported missing. The circumstances surrounding this are under investigation by the National Criminal Investigation Department.

Info 14 is not an organization as such, but a web magazine. Its purpose is to supply an alternative news coverage for the entire White Power movement. Info 14 came to play an important part when a young man had been beaten to death in Salem outside Stockholm in December 2000, and Info 14 was the first to spread the news to the White Power movement. The idea emerged of a manifestation, which was later that year to attract some 1000 persons from the Swedish White Power movement.

The trial against the persons suspected of the murder in Salem opened in January. On its first day, several White Power supporters gathered and caused disturbance. In February the court pronounced sentence on six perpetrators who were regarded as responsible for the crime. Three of them were sentenced to monetary fines and non-institutional care, one to community service for young offenders, one to monetary fines and probation and one to institutional care. Supporters of the White Power movement considered the sentences too mild. Info 14 headed the criticism against the sentences and initiated national leaflet campaigns in which NSF, SMR and Blood & Honour took part. To commemorate the anniversary of the murder, Info 14 again summoned to a manifestation, in the same location as the year before, gathering almost 1 500 participants.

One of the persons administrating Info 14 was prosecuted in May for ethnic agitation, gross incitement to rebellion and threat to public servant in an issue of Info 14 published in 2000. He was sentenced to 18 months in prison but has appealed. Shortly after the trial the police intervened against him due to a new case of ethnic agitation plus unlawful threat. Weapons were found

when the police searched his house and he was later sentenced for serious weapons offences to six months in prison, which he served in 2001.

In connection with the preliminary investigation of the murder of a union representative in October 1999, two men were arrested for violation of the Personal Data Act (PUL). One of them had set up a register of approximately 1,300 persons, who all became plaintiffs in the investigation. The other man had assisted in the collection of data. Säpo's preliminary investigation was concluded in 2001 and the two were prosecuted. The preliminary investigation had revealed that more people had been involved in the collection of personal data. A female employee at a regional social insurance office was prosecuted for unauthorized disclosure of personal data from the National Social Insurance Office. She had done this at the request of her son, who, in his turn, was prosecuted under the Personal Data Act for having collected this information and other personal data in a register. The time for the trial has not yet been set.

The autonomous movement

The autonomous movement is a generic concept embracing a number of groups and individuals characterized by political currents such as libertarian socialism, anarchism and syndicalism. According to anarchism, the capitalist system reinforces the intrinsic unjust systems of hierarchical structures and prevents the emergence of a libertarian socialist society. All forms of hierarchy, on individual, group or society level, are defined by the anarchist as oppression. Only through the abolition of oppression and hierarchical structures in society can libertarian socialism be realized. Syndicalism stresses the leading role of the working class and of the trade unions in the struggle, by direct action, to overthrow the capitalist society and thereby achieve a libertarian socialist society. In later years, the part of the animal rights movement using criminal methods has to a certain extent come to belong to the autonomous movement. One reason for this is that the moral philosophy motivating some animal rights activists has a lot in common with the anarchist definition of oppression. There are persons within the animal rights movement who maintain that man's oppression of animals is equal to oppression based on ethnicity, sex, etc.

In spite of its anti-hierarchical structure, the autonomous movement is very well organized and flexible. There is a more or less unspoken consensus as to evils in society. The protests expressed are often a reaction to developments in the surrounding world, both long-term ones and isolated events. As regards the latter, campaigns and protests from the autonomous network can start and spread like wildfire in very short time.

The primary targets for extra-parliamentary actions emanating from the autonomous movement are the state, supranational institutions and concentrations of power in finance, all of which are considered synonymous with capitalism. Additionally, private individuals and their property may constitute targets should their actions be considered as contributing to various forms of oppression and social injustice in society.

Practically all of the groups described below have in some way taken an active part in planning, preparing and arranging demonstrations and protests with violent features in connection with meetings during the Swedish EU presidency from January to June 2001.

The network that has been something of a trend-setter for the autonomous movement during the major part of the 1990s is Anti-Fascistisk Aktion (AFA, Anti-Fascist Action). AFA is a generic term for a national network represented in the form of smaller groups in several Swedish localities. The individuals that are AFA's driving forces have won the confidence of the other supporters by setting a good example in discussions, meetings, demonstrations and direct actions. They have thereby, in spite of the anti-hierarchical environment, gained status as leaders. Thus, this is not a matter of a formal status, but rather an informal acceptance with a majority within the movement.

AFA's ideology is based on anarchist values, and its advocates focus particularly on the fight against oppression caused by capitalism, racism, sexism and homophobia. They also feel the need to define themselves as a counterbalance to the existing society structure.

During the year, several of AFA's local groups engaged in partially violent demonstrations and protests against the Swedish EU presidency. AFA has also engaged in other activities, some of which have been criminal.

In 2000, an article entitled 'From A to Z for a successful riot' appearing in the magazine Brand was reported by Säpo for inciting rebellion and trials began in December 2001. The charges also included failure to indicate the name of the legally responsible publisher of the magazine. The jury however acquitted the accused. The prosecutor has appealed against the sentence as concerns the failure to indicate the name of the legally responsible publisher.

The activities of the Syndicalist Youth (SUF) in 2001 included protests and demonstrations against the EU and against police brutality. A number of persons linked to SUF were apprehended in connection with the riots at the EU summit in Gothenburg and were charged during the autumn. An incident that received particular attention was when Leif Pagrotsky, Minister of Trade and Industry, and Marit Paulsen, Member of the European Parliament, had cakes thrown at them when taking part in a political soirée at the Arts Centre in Lund. SUF in Lund and Syndicalists against the EU claimed responsibility for this action. The perpetrators were fined.

Revolutionära socialister (RS, Revolutionary Socialists) was founded in 1999 in Linköping. In 2000, they were very active in Linköping and are assumed to have played a key role during the house occupation in Linköping in March 2000. Supporters of the autonomous movement in Linköping were also suspected of an arson attack against a McDonald's restaurant. Three persons were apprehended and charged in the spring of 2001 but were all acquitted. One RS group also attracted attention by carrying out several actions against a sex shop and a bank in Norrköping in 2001.

Reclaim the Street/City (RTS/C) also in 2001 arranged street parties and demonstrations, events that on previous occasions had ended in violent riots. On May Day, various local RTS/C groups arranged street parties. In Stockholm the RTS, jointly with Globalisering Underifrån and Svartskallebrigaden, organized the '18/8 campaign' aiming at organizing a street party in the suburb Djursholm on 18 August. There were a handful of preparatory demonstrations in the Stockholm suburbs during the spring, but the street party in Djursholm never took place. Instead, 1,000-1,500 persons on that day participated in a demonstration through central Stockholm, ending in a party in a large park. A couple of incidents involving graffiti and shoplifting caused the police to intervene.

Globalisering Underifrån (GU, Globalization from below) is the Swedish branch of a broader international mobilization against the IMF, the WTO, the World Bank and the EU. Activities take place according to a 'grassroots principle' focusing on campaigns and actions in connection with summits involving the above organizations. In 2001, the GU engaged mainly in the protests against the EU summit in Gothenburg.

The activities of the militant animal rights movement in Sweden saw a decrease in 2001. A contributing factor may be that the number of potential targets has fallen, since several fur farms have closed down. Possibly, some potential targets may also have improved their security arrangements. Furthermore, many animal rights activists participated in the protests against the Swedish EU presidency, in particular against the Gothenburg summit, something that may have pushed the commitment to animal rights issues into the background during the first six months of the year.

It should be pointed out, however, that the animal rights movement has continued to cause major problems. Actions still include wilful damage, unlawful intrusion, unlawful dispossession, unlawful threat, harassment and arson, and are directed against animal breeding, the meat industry, animal testing, the fur industry, circus activities and hunting. The campaign against the kennel WEMA Hund AB that attracted attention in 2000 continued also in 2001. Other targets included Astra Zeneca in Lund, which was subjected to wilful damage on several occasions. A McDonald's restaurant in Stockholm and one in Malmö were subjected to arson attacks plus serious wilful damage. Svenljunga Mink AB had several trucks damaged in an arson attack. Many fur shops across the country had glue poured into their locks and there have been several actions where minks and chinchillas have been set free. Djurens Befrielsefront (the Animal Liberation Front) was behind most of the above actions. Three animal rights activists were prosecuted in December 2001, suspected of having broken into Skövde slaughter-house and caused 190,000 SEK worth of damage to slaughtering equipment.

It is also worth mentioning that the leader of Socialekologisk Aktion (SEA, Socio-Ecological Action), who in 1999 was sentenced to one year in prison for inciting rebellion, appealed against the sentence. In November 2001, the Court of Appeal reduced the sentence to probation and 100 hours of community service.

Demonstrations, protests and criminal actions targeting EU summits January – June 2001

Below follows an account of activities, such as meetings, demonstrations and protests, plus criminal actions carried out during the Swedish EU presidency January – June 2001 by persons belonging to the autonomous movement. It should be pointed out that a majority of the demonstrations during this period were held in accordance with police directions and were authorized and orderly. These demonstrations are not included in the account below, which describes only extra-parliamentary unlawful activities. The most common extra-parliamentary scenario was

- holding an unauthorized demonstration,
- joining and breaking out of an authorized demonstration or
- gathering again following an authorized demonstration.

Both planned and spontaneous offences were committed in connection with these activities. The most frequent offences were wilful damage in the form of graffiti and/or flag burning.

Protests and offences in connection with meetings during the Swedish EU presidency

Month	Meetings	Protests	Type of offence committed during protests	Police measures
January	7	3	Wilful damage	Section 13, Police Act
February	8	4	Wilful damage	Section 13, Police Act
March	10	6	Wilful damage	Section 13, Police Act
April	19	10	Wilful damage, blockade, violent riot	Sect. 13, Police Act, arrests
May	20	8	Wilful damage, blockade	Arrests
June	8	1	Wilful damage, blockade, violent riot	Sect. 13, Police Act, arrests

Column 2 shows the total number of EU meetings in a given month, and column 3 the number of meetings that met with protests in the form of extra-parliamentary activities. Column 4 shows actions that took place some time during the protests and column 5 shows the police measures necessary.

Section 13 of the Police Act regulates a police officer's right to, when necessary to maintain public order, turn away or remove a person from a certain area or certain premises or, if this proves inadequate for achieving the intended result, take the person into temporary custody.

Four of the protests were of a more serious nature. They are described below.

The European Council met in Stockholm on 23-24 March. Approximately 200 persons from the Extra-Parliamentary Left, of which RTS/C is a part, gathered on the Friday night. When the demonstrators armed themselves with stones they were surrounded by police. 194 young people were taken into custody for disturbance of public order under Section 13 of the Police Act.

On 20-22 April the informal meeting of the Finance Ministers took place in Malmö. According to the web magazine *Motkraft* (Counter-force), issue 110, a new network was formed in Malmö already on 22 January, which on the 12 March issued a press release presenting some of the plans for protests. The network referred to ia the partially violent protests during the EU, WTO

and IMF meetings in Nice, Seattle and Prague. The demonstration on 21 April gathered more than 1,000 persons. Several persons from the autonomous movement were masked and had prepared for confrontations with the police. In a targeted action against this group of demonstrators 266 persons were taken into custody and three were arrested for violent riot.

The Foreign Ministers' informal meeting took place on 5 May in Nyköping. GU, SUF and AFA arranged a demonstration gathering 200 participants. During the march a handful of demonstrators masked themselves and there was some disturbance.

The EU summit in Gothenburg on 14 -16 June, and the visit by President Bush in connection with this, was the main focus of the autonomous movement. Already at an early stage it was obvious that the Swedish autonomous movement would follow the pattern set for previous summits. In January the umbrella organizations GBG 2001 and Göteborgs Icke-våldsnätverk (Gothenburg's non-violence network) were founded. They created websites aiming at national as well as international mobilization, and there were indications that also Gothenburg would see protests similar to those expressed in Seattle, Prague and Nice.

Already on 12 June, 42 persons were taken into custody, in accordance with Section 13 of the Police Act, when the police broke up a camp of tents in central Gothenburg. On the same day, the police searched a downtown apartment and found five Danish citizens suspected of preparation to sabotage. Among the items seized were home-made grenades, masking equipment, photographic equipment and an evil-smelling liquid, probably butyric acid. The Danes were prosecuted but were freed by the District Court.

On Thursday 14 June 459 persons were arrested, the majority for violent riot. Most of them were arrested during the police intervention at the Hvitfeldtska Upper Secondary School, when a further 11 persons were taken into custody in accordance with Section 13 of the Police Act.

On Friday 15 June 124 persons were taken into custody under Section 13 of the Police Act in connection with the violent riots in central Gothenburg. There had also been indications that a secret operations centre would be set up during the Gothenburg summit in accordance with a modus operandi known from similar meetings in other countries. One of the tasks of this operations centre would be to intercept police radio communications and provide activists in downtown Gothenburg with information. The police located the operations centre, in an apartment in the outskirts of Gothenburg, and searched the premises during the night of 15 June. It has been established that there was certain communication between the activists and the operations centre. The apartment contained 2 computers linked to the Internet and with functions for group transmission of SMS messages, scanners for tapping into the police radio system, mobile phones and a paper-shredder. 12 persons in the apartment were arrested, suspected of preparation to sabotage or inciting rebellion. Eight of them were prosecuted and sentenced to prison for 3 - 4 years. They all appealed, and the Court of Appeal more or less halved the District Court penalties.

29 persons were arrested on Saturday 16 June when the police intervened against an unauthorized demonstration in Järntorget, Gothenburg. A further 179 persons were taken into custody in central Gothenburg, under Section 13 of the Police Act.

During the summit there were also frequent disturbances to police radio traffic. The radio disturbances recurred regularly for shorter or longer periods during all meeting days, most frequently in connection with the most demanding police operations. In the night of 16 June, the police located the disturbances to an apartment outside Gothenburg. The man found in the apartment was arrested on suspicions of sabotage. He was prosecuted and sentenced to one year in prison.

Furthermore, 186 persons were deported under the Aliens' Act during the period 12-17 June. Subsequent preliminary investigations and identifications have resulted in a further 40 arrests.

In addition to the protests against the EU meetings as such, there have also been other activities aimed at drawing attention to the EU. A cake was thrown in Finance Minister Bo Ringholm's face. A press release from a group calling itself the cake brigade stated that the intention was to 'draw attention to the coming protests during the Gothenburg summit'. On 18 April there was a protest action in Lund, where some 50 persons from the autonomous movement pulled down and burned an EU flag.

COUNTER-ESPIONAGE

The Counter-Espionage Section is tasked with the prevention and uncovering of threats against national external security, ie espionage and unlawful intelligence activities.

The Section's functions also include monitoring and combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as well as such equipment and substances as allow manufacture or use of these weapons.

The intelligence threat against Sweden remains and is tangible, which is explained by the fact that Sweden is interesting in a number of areas given high priority by many intelligence actors. A further indication of this is that several large intelligence services have a representation in Sweden that is extensive in comparison with many other European countries. At least 15 states have intelligence officers stationed in Sweden, and intelligence staff from an additional number of countries travel to Sweden for missions on a fairly regular basis. Among the staff of intelligence services active in Sweden there are officially reported as well as unreported members. The use of legal and illegal methods varies considerably between different categories of intelligence staff, but many use a combination of the two.

Preventive action is fundamental to Säpo's counter-espionage activities, which aim to interrupt and prevent various forms of intelligence activity before they have gone so far that anyone has engaged in espionage or other crime. A large part of the Counter-Espionage Section's work therefore aims to interrupt conspiratorial contacts before any recruitment takes place and to prevent other kinds of illegal intelligence activities. Increasing the awareness of risks of intelligence activities against potential intelligence targets of national importance is also vital. In 2001 Säpo was able to interrupt several recruitment attempts and other activities, which is why a number of persons with intelligence missions are no longer active in Sweden.

Different intelligence actors focus on different intelligence targets. In Sweden many intelligence officers clearly focus on scientific, technological and financial intelligence activities, areas that are also strongly connected with defence-related intelligence gathering. But foreign intelligence services engage also in political intelligence activities, refugee espionage or activities targeting a third country. Political intelligence activities have seen a slight decline these past few years, whereas scientific and technological intelligence activities have increased.

In the political area, intelligence activities focus mainly on the gathering of information on issues relating to security and foreign policy. Sometimes, the motive may however be to produce masked propaganda, trying to make biased information appear objective by hiding the real sender from the receiver. Examples include free trips where the financier remains anonymous, seminars and dinners planned by intelligence officers and newspaper articles edited by intelligence interests. The level of awareness

against this type of intelligence activities is usually high, something that does not, however, stop certain intelligence actors from using this method.

Foreign financial and technological intelligence activities often go hand in hand and it is not unusual that eg technological intelligence gathering for military purposes can be used also to create financial advantages. This applies in particular to states that have declared that strategic competence and financial security are of national interest and should be supported with the help of intelligence services. Strategic competence, spearhead technology, market shares, competitiveness and information superiority are catchwords for this gathering.

In general it can be said that tactical and operative military gathering has focused mainly on disputed geographical areas. As for the rest, the defence-related strategic intelligence gathering to a great extent overlaps the financial and technological gathering. An expansive development in research fields such as biotechnology, science of materials, optoelectronics and data fusion is needed for a country to maintain, in relative terms, today's military capacity tomorrow. This is mirrored also in the present-day focus of the intelligence services. Strategic gathering may for some intelligence actors also include finding the weak points of the Swedish defence and infrastructure.

Säpo in 2001 intervened against attempts from foreign intelligence services to monitor oppositional refugees and organizations in Sweden. This activity has been taken very seriously, since it may have far-reaching consequences to individuals and is ultimately a violation of Sweden's political integrity.

Säpo's work to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is carried out jointly by the counter-espionage and counter-terrorism sections. This work, as previously, takes place in close cooperation with other authorities and focuses on the states and non-governmental organizations with an ambition to acquire such weapons. Following the terrorist attacks in the USA, there is increased focus on non-governmental attempts. In 2001, a number of states tried to acquire, in Sweden, products that may be used for this purpose. Their monitoring and purchases via the Internet and the increased cooperation among such states have caused Swedish authorities to improve cooperation on several levels at the same time as focusing on the opponent's weakest links is becoming increasingly common. A mustering of strength has been necessary to identify and keep an eye in particular on the products and competence crucial in the development of weapons of mass destruction. As part of the preventive work, Säpo regularly visits companies exporting products that can be used for mass destruction.

No matter what the intelligence target may be, more and more of the legal as well as the illegal gathering now takes place using technical aids, and an increasing number of states and their intelligence services invest large resources in improving this capacity. However, such a capacity to a high extent depends on the ability to exploit advanced signals interception, encryption forcing and automated information selection. Ambitions are however facilitated by continuous improvement of the tools for eg signals intelligence, Internet interception and computer intrusion.

An increase in international contacts plus technological advances have led to new gathering methods, used by old as well as new intelligence actors. Examples of factors affecting the choice of method are the resources available, the intelligence focus and the technological ability in combination with opportunities to approach the intelligence target in question in as natural a way as possible. Consequently, an Asian state does not use the same methods to acquire products for weapons of mass destruction as a European company uses to keep an eye on competing companies, or as another country uses to monitor oppositionals in Sweden. It is also easy to understand that the access to sophisticated technology may affect the method used to approach potential intelligence targets in Sweden.

Examples of platforms and methods used for illegal intelligence activities:

- Research institutes and guest researchers
- Companies (consultants, IT companies, airlines, journalists etc.)
- False dissidents
- Delegation visits & travelling special teams
- Signals intelligence
- Official missions and agencies

The Internet has undoubtedly made the gathering of information easier for the intelligence services. Supplementary illegal gathering is however often needed to reach the final aim. It is therefore not surprising that conspiratorial methods and contacts plus recruitment are still used to gain access to various types of spearhead information. The information required is often characterized by being secret or, if not, by containing material so sensitive that it is not available to the public. Achieving an information advantage is the overriding aim for the major part of the intelligence activities.

COUNTER-TERRORISM

The Counter-Terrorism Section is tasked with combating international terrorism and with the prevention and uncovering of refugee espionage and other persecution of foreigners in Sweden by regimes or organizations in other countries that are linked with politically motivated violence. This task also includes analysing threats against persons to be protected, state visits or similar events, and taking appropriate measures based on these analyses.

Within the framework of the international cooperation Sweden has joined in the fight against terrorism acts of violence with foreign political motives shall be prevented, regardless of whether these acts are intended to be committed in Sweden or abroad. In this regard, Säpo's activities have to be in line with eg UN Resolution 1269, on measures for the combating of international terrorism, which states that countries that have signed the resolution are under obligation to cooperate to bring terrorists to justice and to exchange information so that acts of terrorism can be prevented. The resolution further stresses the importance of preventing member countries from being so-called safe havens, ie protected zones where terrorists can establish bases for national as well as international attacks. This also includes cooperation to prevent terrorists from being granted asylum under false identities in any of the participating countries. Säpo's work is also influenced by the *UN Convention for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism (New York 990912)* signed by Sweden on 15 October 2001.

Following the terror attacks in the USA, the EU Council of Ministers has also, within the framework of intergovernmental cooperation in police and judicial issues, agreed on a framework decision on the combating of terrorism. The aim is to facilitate measures in this area by creating a more uniform legislation in the member countries.

According to this framework decision a number of crimes – such as murder, causing severe bodily harm, taking hostage, wilful damage to public institutions, causing disturbance to information systems and hijacking of public transports – can be regarded as terrorist crimes should they be committed for such ends as may be regarded as characteristic of terrorism. It is stated that these ends may include striking serious fear into the population, unduly forcing public institutions or international organizations to take or refrain from taking certain action, or causing harm to the fundamental political, financial or social system of a country or an international organization. The penalty for an action constituting a terrorist crime shall be more severe than for the same action carried out for other ends.

In addition to this definition of terrorism there is also an interpretation clause, which specifically states that the definition must not be interpreted in such a way that it can be used to accuse of terrorism persons exercising their fundamental right to manifest their opinions, even if they commit crimes while doing so. Thus, legislation must not become a support for the oppression of peaceful opposition. It should, for instance, not be possible to

label a person a terrorist only because he or she takes part in a demonstration that turns violent.

The framework decision also lays down that leading a terrorist group or participating in its activities shall be a punishable crime, if the person who does so is aware that this contributes to terrorist crime.

The framework decision is binding for the EU member states inasmuch as they, before the end of the year 2002, must take the measures necessary to comply with its regulations. Swedish legislation currently does not include the notion of terrorism, which is why Sweden does not yet have specific penalty regulations for terrorist actions. A new bill in this area is expected for the autumn of 2002.

These past years, an internationalization of the Islamist struggle has taken place. An increasing number of Islamists who have no longer been able to act freely in their home countries or in the area where they have been staying, have spread across the world. In their new home countries they have then found the opportunity to establish contacts with representatives of other Islamist organizations in exile. Säpo has also been able to note an increased interest in the international Islamist struggle (Jihad) among persons who have not previously shown any signs of interests in that direction. This has formed the basis for logistic support to the struggle in the conflict areas and for cooperation with ideological organizations such as Osama bin Laden's network al Qaida worldwide. Although the sympathisers in the network may have differing purposes they have been able to gather, with Jihad as the connecting link. In addition to the fight against their respective opponents they cooperate against the common enemy, ie the western world. The groups are usually not linked with any specific nation, but are rather privately sponsored than state-supported. Particularly Afghanistan and Pakistan have however been criticised for the support they have provided by putting their territory at the disposal of these groups as a base for terrorist activities. A further sign of the transnational nature of this network is that the struggle does not take place in any specific territory but rather where it is practically possible to carry out an attack.

In Sweden, a number of persons from eg Northern Africa and Africa's horn have been proved to be connected with the Islamist network. Some of them are in close contact with persons in key positions within the al Qaida, whereas others can be regarded as supporters. Some persons who are domiciled in Sweden have previously trained for the armed struggle in bin Laden's training camps in Afghanistan. Certain persons in these circles have also been in contact with leading extremists in Europe belonging to the very nucleus of al Qaida.

Already early in 2001 there were indications that bin Ladin was planning bomb attacks in Europe. As a result of a well-functioning international exchange of information between various security and intelligence services, among them Säpo, a number of successful crack-downs against persons within the network could take place. Up until mid-April 2001, a total of 18 persons had been apprehended in a series of operations in Europe. During

some of these, weapons and chemicals intended for the manufacture of explosives were seized.

Following the attacks against the USA on September 11, Säpo intensified its monitoring of the branches of the Islamist network in Sweden. This monitoring has provided Säpo with information on individuals who have not previously come to Säpo attention. They belong, for instance, to a new generation of Islamist extremists in Sweden. The majority of them have studied Islam at radical Islamist centres in eg Yemen and Saudi Arabia. The attacks in the USA also led to an intensification of the international cooperation with other security and intelligence services. This resulted in a number of arrests across Europe of Islamists linked to al Qaida. From a Swedish point of view, however, the threat from the Islamist network is aimed primarily at a third country and also in the future mainly at American interests. During the past year, Säpo has not, however, found any tangible threats of attacks in Swedish territory, against Swedish or foreign interests.

As an example of the strong increase in intensity as concerns counter-terrorism it can be mentioned that Säpo, following the terrorist attacks in the USA had to set up a special group to deal with tips and other information mainly from the public but also from police authorities across Sweden. At the end of the year 2001, approximately 500 tips had come in, a large number of them of the kind that merited further investigation

Apart from al Qaida supporters there are in Sweden also members and supporters of other organizations and groups who, in their respective home countries as well as internationally, engage in activities that can be defined as terrorism. These persons' activities in Sweden last year consisted mainly of propaganda dissemination, fund-raising and various forms of logistic support to fellow members. This goes also for the groups and organizations that actively support the Palestinians' struggle against Israel. The year 2001 saw an escalation of the conflict that broke out in September 2000. The Palestinians have carried out a large number of attacks against Israeli interests, and the Israelis have regularly responded by acts of retaliation. Säpo and cooperating security and intelligence services are following the developments in order to prevent possible attacks internationally.

Another priority in the field of counter-terrorism is the monitoring of foreign regime-run agent networks operating in Sweden in order to detect whether and to what extent these networks can be associated with terrorism. The functions of such agents are to provide local support for actions or attacks on behalf of their regimes and to monitor leading representatives of the opposition who are believed to pose a threat to the regime concerned. Säpo last year observed such activity on a number of occasions and has intervened against and interrupted foreign intelligence service monitoring of oppositional refugees and organizations.

An important element of preventive counter-terrorism is working for refusal of entry to Sweden, or expulsion from the country, of aliens who are active members of organizations engaging in politically motivated violence. This is done by commenting on applications for political asylum submitted by the Swedish Migration Board for consideration. The Migration Board, the

Aliens Appeals Board and the Government additionally ask Säpo's opinion about matters relating to residence permits and Swedish citizenship. In 2001, the number of applications has increased considerably. One reason for this is a change in Migration Board procedures, but also Sweden's adherence to the Schengen agreement has resulted in a large number of cases being referred to Säpo. In 2001, Säpo gave its opinion in 3,635 such cases. In approximately one per cent of these cases Säpo did not sanction the applications. In addition to other preventive measures, Säpo last year effected decisions on expulsion of a number of persons found to be linked to international terrorism.

Säpo also produces assessments of threats, primarily against particular individuals but also against various institutions. Not only Säpo but also other police authorities base their protective measures on these assessments.

There is a continuous follow-up of the generally prevailing threat against the central Government and the Royal family. Furthermore, general assessments of the threat against EU interests and certain foreign states' interests in Sweden are also carried out. In total, 18 such general threat assessments were produced in 2001. In addition to this, approximately 312 tactical threat assessments were produced for particular events or circumstances, such as incoming state visits, Swedish visits abroad, conferences or EU meetings arranged in Sweden, eg the EU summit in Gothenburg.

MISCELLANEOUS

A matter of future interest to Säpo is the work initiated by the Government in late 1998, first assigned to a parliamentary committee and then to the National Police Board (RPS). The committee was to investigate the need for Säpo and the regular police to join forces in order to fight organized crime. One possibility given attention was the creation of an integrated national police resource by merging the National Criminal Investigation Department (RKP) and Säpo. The National Police Board was tasked with studying the boundaries between the regular police and Säpo as well as between the National Police Board and the regional police authorities, against the background of the committee's report *The Central Police* (Den centrala polisen, SOU 2000:25) and the viewpoints forwarded during its circulation for consideration by the bodies concerned.

The National Police Board presented its findings in June 2001, suggesting that Säpo and RKP would be replaced by a new integrated operative unit within RPS. In the ensuing circulation process it turned out – as was the case when the committee's proposal was circulated for comment – that several referral bodies were cautious of the suggestion. One reason for this was that they considered the decision data insufficient to come to a conclusion about an organizational change.

The Government thereafter commissioned a new report from RPS, to be presented no later than 1 October 2002. With the aim of strengthening the capacity of the police service to fight serious organized crime, RPS shall, on one hand, develop the cooperation between the regular police and Säpo, on the other make changes as regards the distribution of responsibilities and tasks between them, or, where appropriate, suggest such changes to the Government. Measures, intended to clarify the roles, must at the same time be kept largely within the framework of the current organizational structure and be taken in close cooperation with the police service branches concerned. This work is urgent and results should, provided this is suitable, be presented as the work proceeds.

Having been granted a new deadline for its task, now to be concluded by the end of 2002, the Security Service Commission, appointed by the Government, in 2001 continued its review of the working methods employed by the Swedish security services, Säpo included, when identifying and studying Swedish extremist organizations and groups considered a real or potential threat against national security. The period investigated runs from the end of the Second World War until the present day. The Commission has full access to Säpo's files and other information.

Changes to the secrecy legislation were introduced as of 1 April 1999. These changes enabled Säpo to disclose, under certain circumstances, information previously subject to absolute secrecy. Last year, 392 persons requested access to such information, and Säpo processed 338 requests (incl. balance from 2000). In 118 cases the person in question was registered in a Säpo register. Information from the registers was disclosed to 93 of these persons.

In 1999, the Government commissioned the Records Board to investigate whether individual employment conditions may have been unreasonably affected by the disclosure of information from Säpo's registers. Investigations would take place upon demand from persons who felt that this may have been the case. Slightly more than 200 persons asked for their cases to be investigated. The Board presented its findings to the Government on 3 October 2000. In 2001, the Government decided that six persons would receive ex gratia compensation, and also tasked the Board with a new investigation of the same kind.